附件 4

厦门大学研究生课程教学大纲

开课学院/研究院	经济学院	授课学期	春季学期
课程名称	高级微观经济学 II		
课程英文名称	Advanced Microeconomics II		
*课程编码	50010007	面向对象	Master and Ph.D Students
先修课程或 预备知识要求	Advanced Microeconomics I and Mathematical Economics		
课程学科分类	■一级学科课程　　　□二级学科课程　　　□研究方向课程		
课程内容分类 （可多选）	■理论讲授类　　□实验类　□实务或实践类　■研究方法类　　□研讨类 ■文献类　　　　□其他＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿（请注明）		
总学分/总学时	**3/64**	实践（含实验）学时	0
任课教师	王云、薛绍杰、Inkee Jang	联系方式	yunwang@xmu.edu.cn schsuechieh@msn.com inkeejang@wustl.edu
助教	TBD	联系方式	
中文课程简介 (Course description in Chinese)	**对此门课程要达到的教学目标的描述和分析，体现教师的教学理念。300-500 字为宜。** 使学生深刻理解现代微观经济学、博弈论、信息经济学以及机制设计理论的基本概念和前沿研究范畴，并准确掌握其分析框架和基本方法。 本课程主要介绍博弈论、信息经济学、机制设计、社会选择理论。博弈推理贯穿于经济理论各个分支，并广泛应用于其他社会和行为科学。本课程主要介绍了博弈理论的主要思想，学习和理解博弈论是如何为经济学中存在的信息和机制设计问题，以及为其他领域如商学、生物、政治科学以及生活中的决策来提供解决方法。在课程的学习中，我们将精确地定义所有概念，并且运用严密的逻辑推理进行分析；同时，我们强调的理论背后的思想，而不是仅仅是数学上的表达形式。本课程的开课对象是经济、金融专业的所有一年级研究生。 本课程的内容分三部分： 第一部分为社会选择理论。主要内容：社会选择与福利； 第二部分为博弈论。主要内容：（1）博弈论基本概念；（2）信息经济学（逆向选择，道德风险）； 第三部分为机制设计。主要内容：拍卖与机制设计。		

英文课程简介 （Course description in English）	Describe the teaching aims of this course, and state your teaching ideas and philosophy. 300-500 words are recommended. This course introduces students to game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and social choice theory. The emphasis is on the unifying perspective that game theory offers to questions in economics, and many other disciplines including business, biology, and political science. We will introduce rigorous mathematical and economic tools in order to analyze strategic interactions between individuals, and the outcome of such interaction under both complete and incomplete information. The nature and method of strategic agents and mechanism designers to make decisions while constrained by other agents' incentivized behavior will be analyzed.
课程内容 与预期成果 （Course content & Expected Learning Outcomes）	列出课程的内容概要和计划进度。 列出任课教师希望通过此门课程达到的学习成果，包括掌握知识/技能层面、发展能力层面、培养态度和价值观层面等。 Part A Game Theory: (1) Game Theory Basic Concept; (2) Information Economics (Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard) Part B Mechanism Design: Auction and Revenue Maximizing Mechanism Part C Social Choice: (1) Social Choice Theory; (2) Collective Decision and Welfare. Textbook: Jehle, A. Geoffrey and Philip J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, English Reprint Edition, Person Education North Asia Limited and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2001. First to sixth week: Chapter 7: Game Theory (Game Theory Basic Concepts, Nash Equilibrium, Strategic-form game, Extensive-form game, Bayesian game.) Seventh to eighth week: Chapter 8: Information Economics (Information Economics: Incomplete information game, Adverse selection; Moral hazard) Ninth to twelfth week: Chapter 9: Auction and Mechanism Design (Mechanism Design: Auction and Revenue Maximizing Mechanism) Thirteenth to fourteenth week: Chapter 6: Social Choice and Welfare (Social Choice Theory, Collective Decision and Welfare)

	The aim of this course is to prepare graduate-level students with the microeconomic theory related to their future fields of interests. The requirements are 1. Homework Assignments/Class Participation 2. Midterm Exam Final Exam
教学方式 和学习活动 (Teaching and learning activities)	列出教师的教学方式和计划开展的学习活动内容，应与前列课程目标和预期学习成果相对应。 This course introduces students to game theory, information economics, mechanism design, and social choice theory. The emphasis is on the unifying perspective that game theory offers to questions in economics, and many other disciplines including business, biology, and political science. We will introduce rigorous mathematical and economic tools in order to analyze strategic interactions between individuals, and the outcome of such interaction under both complete and incomplete information. The nature and method of strategic agents and mechanism designers to make decisions while constrained by other agents' incentivized behavior will be analyzed. 1. Assignments should be submitted on Wednesdays to TA in class. 2. Late submission without the instructor's written permission will NOT be accepted. To get permission, contact me in advance – at least two days before the due date. 3. To be fair to all students, any late submission without permission will get zero credit.
考核方式 Assessment Criteria	明确列出每一种考核方式的权重及评价标准，并说明对学术诚信的具体要求和核查措施。 **Homework Assignments/Class Participation 10%** **Midterm Exam 45%** **Final Exam 45%** **Attendance:** **1. Instructor or teaching assistant will check attendance at least 5 times during the semester.** **2. Failure to show up in class without having asked for a leave for three or more times will result in zero credit in the "homework and attendance" grade. Failure to show up in class without having asked for a leave for**

	four or more times will result in suspension of qualification for final exam.
	3. **For legitimate reasons and procedures to ask for a leave, please refer to the latest policy by the Graduate Committee of the School of Economics, Xiamen University.**
	Exams:
	1. **Exams are closed book.**
	2. **If you could not take an exam (either the Midterm or the Final) on the scheduled date, please contact me at least two days before the test date. Make-up exam(s) will be of the same length but from a different set of questions.**
	3. **Midterm exam will be held before the end of the 9th week of the semester. You will be notified at least two weeks in prior.**
	4. **Final exam will be held during the university's final exam week.**
	Academic Integrity:
	Students are expected to comply with Xiamen University's Policy on Academic Integrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will be required to participate in the procedural process as outlined in the University Guidelines on Academic Integrity.

学习资源 (Learning Resources)	包括教材、参考书、参考文献，以及其他获取课程学习资源的途径等。 1. Jehle, A. Geoffrey and Philip J. Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, English Reprint Edition, Person Education North Asia Limited and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press, 2001. 2. Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press; 1ST edition (June 15, 1995) 3. Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory，The MIT Press; First edition (July 12, 1994) 4. Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press; 1ST edition (August 7, 2003)
备注	凡表格以上部分无法涵盖、教师认为需要说明的问题，请在此列出。

*新开设课程可不填写课程编码，同意开设后由教学秘书编码并填入本表。
注：凡授课对象含海外学生的课程必须同时提供本表中所有内容的英文版本。